Ṣād 38:75-76

Qāla yā Iblīsu mā manaʿaka an tasjuda limā khalaqtu bi-yadayy, astakbarta am kunta mina'l-ʿālīn · Qāla ana khayrun minhu, khalaqtanī min nārin wa khalaqtahū min ṭīn

"He said: 'Iblīs! What held you back from prostrating to what I created with My two hands? Did you grow proud, or were you of the exalted?' He said: 'I am better than he; You created me from fire and created him from clay.'"

And here there is something striking: a question is asked.

I record this as my own reading, and its ground is the verse itself: what Iblīs did is already known (the seventy-fourth verse said it). Nonetheless a question is asked and a ground demanded.

And the question comes with two alternatives: astakbarta am kunta mina'l-ʿālīn?

The difference between the two alternatives is the same as what was recorded for istikbār in the discussion of al-Baqara: Form istifʿāl conveys reckoning a thing so; al-ʿālīn, on the other hand, are those who are in fact high.

I record this as my own reading: the question offers Iblīs two options — a supposition or a fact? And Iblīs's answer chooses neither of them: it brings an analogy.

مَنَعَ — root م-ن-ع: to prevent, to hold back.

And the choice of verb must be recorded: it does not say "why did you not prostrate?" It says "what prevented you?"

I record this as my own reading: the question assumes that prostration is the ordinary thing. Had there been no obstacle, prostration would have followed. The question asks Iblīs, that is, not for a ground but for an obstacle.

And Iblīs can show no obstacle; in its place he brings a claim of superiority. The two are not the same thing.

A note of tanzīh is necessary, and it is the same as the note entered above for rūḥī.

This expression cannot be understood in a way that ascribes an organ, a limb or corporeality to God. Two attitudes are transmitted in the classical commentaries:

I convey both and do not impose a preference.

What must be recorded is the expression's function in the scene, and this is beyond dispute: the construct conveys a distinction. The being Iblīs is asked to prostrate to is not presented as an ordinary being.

And the use of the dual (yadayy — two hands) is dwelt on as well: the Qurʾān uses the singular (yaduhū) and the plural (aydīnā — Yāsīn 36/71) elsewhere. I say nothing definite about the weight of meaning in this difference.

And now we come to the real subject of this section of the sūra: Iblīs makes an analogy.

In al-Baqara at 2/34 this sentence was treated by way of al-Aʿrāf 7/12, and there the following was recorded:

"Pride is born of a comparison. Iblīs makes no claim of worth on his own account; he compares himself with another and comes out superior. Pride is not seeing oneself high but seeing another low; its measure is always another. And the comparison itself is faulty: to set fire against earth and declare fire superior is an assumption. Fire burns and consumes; earth carries and brings forth. Iblīs has invented a hierarchy and put himself at the top of it."

I rely on that and do not repeat it here.

Here I add three things belonging to Ṣād's own construction.

One: the logical form of the sentence. What Iblīs says is, in form, a complete inference:

I record this as my own reading, and its ground is the three lines above: both of Iblīs's premises are true and agree with the text itself. What is false is the assumption that the conclusion follows from them. The names of the two materials have been given; nowhere has any information been given about which is superior. Iblīs has added that step himself.

And this form of error belongs to the same family as the objections at the beginning of the sūra:

In all three the same thing is missing: where the measure comes from is not stated.

Two: the command is not mentioned at all in the sentence. The question put to Iblīs concerned not obeying a command. The answer says nothing about the command; it speaks of the material.

I record this as my own reading: Iblīs changes the subject. The question was about obedience; the answer is about worth. And as was recorded in al-Baqara, what was rejected is not Adam but the command — while Iblīs in his answer speaks only of Adam.

Three: a verbal link within the sūra. In the forty-seventh and forty-eighth verses the prophets were named al-akhyār (the best). The root is خ-ي-ر.

And in the seventy-sixth verse Iblīs uses the same root of himself: ana khayrun minh.

This is a shared wording that can be verified, and I record it as my own reading: the same root, in the one an attribute given, in the other an attribute claimed. The sūra thereby draws attention to who it is that says a thing is "good".

And the original sense of the root supports this: خ-ي-ر — ikhtiyār, to choose. In the forty-seventh verse the prophets were also named al-muṣṭafayn (the chosen). To be "good", that is, was tied in the forty-seventh verse to a being chosen. Iblīs chooses himself.