وَٱلَّذِينَ يَرْمُونَ أَزْوَٰجَهُمْ وَلَمْ يَكُن لَّهُمْ شُهَدَآءُ إِلَّآ أَنفُسُهُمْ فَشَهَٰدَةُ أَحَدِهِمْ أَرْبَعُ شَهَٰدَٰتٍۭ بِٱللَّهِ إِنَّهُۥ لَمِنَ ٱلصَّٰدِقِينَ · وَٱلْخَٰمِسَةُ أَنَّ لَعْنَتَ ٱللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ إِن كَانَ مِنَ ٱلْكَٰذِبِينَ
Wa'lladhīna yarmūna azwājahum wa lam yakun lahum shuhadāʾu illā anfusuhum fa-shahādatu aḥadihim arbaʿu shahādātin bi'llāhi innahū la-mina'l-ṣādiqīn · Wa'l-khāmisatu anna laʿnata'llāhi ʿalayhi in kāna mina'l-kādhibīn
"And those who cast a charge at their wives and have no witnesses but themselves — the testimony of such a man is four testimonies sworn by God that he is of the truthful. And the fifth, that the curse of God be upon him if he is of the liars."
Liʿān (لِعَان) is a subject of its own in classical jurisprudence, and there is broad disagreement among the schools about its consequences. In this section no juristic detail is entered into and no ruling is issued. What will be treated is the structure and the language of the verses.
But the condition changes: in the fourth verse four witnesses were required; here there is the qualification wa lam yakun lahum shuhadāʾu illā anfusuhum — "if they have no witnesses but themselves".
| 24/4 | 24/6 | |
|---|---|---|
| Verb | yarmūn | yarmūn |
| Object | al-muḥṣanāt — general | azwājahum — their wives |
| The way of proof | Four witnesses | Four oaths |
| If it cannot be proved | Eighty strokes | The other party swears too |
The verse thus sets apart the one case in which the heavy condition of proof laid down in the fourth verse cannot be applied, and there it puts an oath in the place of a witness.
That the number is kept is worth noting: four. The number of witnesses was four; the number of oaths is four as well. The text does not change the weight required for proof — it changes only its kind.
The structure of liʿān is the same for both parties, and this symmetry is the most striking side of the verses:
| The man (6-7) | The woman (8-9) | |
|---|---|---|
| Number of oaths | Four | Four |
| Their content | innahū la-mina'l-ṣādiqīn — that he is of the truthful | innahū la-mina'l-kādhibīn — that he is of the liars |
| The fifth | laʿnatu'llāhi ʿalayh — the curse | ghaḍabu'llāhi ʿalayhā — the anger |
| Its condition | in kāna mina'l-kādhibīn | in kāna mina'l-ṣādiqīn |
The symmetry is all but exact, and the only difference lies in the word of the fifth oath: laʿna and ghaḍab.
لَعْنَة — root ل-ع-ن: to drive away, to expel. A laʿna is a being driven far from mercy — at the centre of the word stands distance.
The classical commentaries have met the difference between the two words with several explanations, and I prefer none of them:
| Explanation | Its content |
|---|---|
| 1 | There is no marked difference of degree between the two words in point of meaning; the verse-ending and the harmony of sound have been observed |
| 2 | The words have to do with the difference in the position of the two parties |
| 3 | Ghaḍab is counted the heavier, and this has to do with the second party's being the one who speaks last |
The oath, that is, is named with the word shahāda. What was required in the fourth verse was shuhadāʾ (witnesses); what is required here is shahādāt (testimonies).
The same root, in two different forms: the one a person (four separate human beings), the other an act (four separate declarations).
I record this as my own reading, and its ground is the form of the words: the text puts a man's own declaration in the place of four separate testimonies, and does so without changing the word. The oath is placed here not as an expression of feeling but as a procedural act.
The condition of the fourth verse — four witnesses — is in practice all but impossible for a husband. Had the condition been applied as it stands, two results would follow: either the claimant would receive eighty strokes for failing to prove his claim, or the claim could never be voiced at all.
The verse opens a third way: the claim is stated within a procedural frame, the other party answers within a procedural frame of the same weight, and the matter is closed by leaving the truth of the oaths to God.
Liʿān, then, is not a procedure of proof but a procedure of exit. Which of the two is telling the truth is not settled by a ruling.
I record this as my own reading; its ground is that the oaths of both parties are qualified by a conditional clause (in kāna) — that is, the text does not itself announce which of the two is telling the truth.
Over the juristic consequences — the state of the marriage, paternity, the possibility of coming together again, the ruling where one refuses to swear — there is broad disagreement among the schools. None of it is transmitted in this section and no ruling is issued.