2/184 — Counted days and the ransom
"For counted days. Whoever among you is sick or on a journey, then a number of other days. And for those who can bear it there is a ransom: the feeding of a poor person. Whoever does more good of his own accord, it is better for him. And that you fast is better for you — if you but knew."
"Counted days." This expression is placed at the very head of the ruling and states a limit: the obligation is not open-ended but counted.
And this exact expression had occurred once before in the sūra — and moreover in exactly the opposite work:
| Verse | Who says it | For what |
|---|---|---|
| 2/80 | Those addressed | "The fire will not touch us except for a counted number of days" — to make the punishment smaller |
| 2/184 | The sentence of ruling | "For counted days" — to make the obligation lighter |
I record this as my own reading: the same expression is in one place the word of a groundless wish and in the other the clause of a ruling. At verse 80 that claim was answered with "Have you taken a covenant from God?" Here a covenant is given — but not for the shortness of the punishment, for the limit of the obligation.
The same expression will be used a third time in the sūra, for the days of the pilgrimage (2/203).
| Situation | Solution | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| Sick or travelling | fa-ʿiddatun min ayyāmin ukhar | The obligation is postponed — the number is kept |
| Those who can bear it | fidyatun ṭaʿāmu miskīn | The obligation is transformed — another work takes its place |
In the first solution the fast is not dropped, its time changes. This is a measure seen elsewhere in the sūra as well: at verse 239 the prayer is not lifted in a state of fear, its form changes. In hardship the obligation does not fall; its form is lightened.
In the second solution what takes its place is of another kind: an obligation belonging to the body is replaced by one belonging to property. And what is set in its place is not arbitrary: the feeding of a poor person. The one who cannot cut himself off from food and drink feeds another.
I record this as my own reading: that the substitute should be chosen in this way also shows what fasting looks to. The ransom is fixed not as money but as food; and the recipient is one who is hungry. A fast that cannot be kept is made good through another's hunger.
This part of the verse is one of the known debates in the history of exegesis and must not be concealed.
يُطِيقُونَهُ — root ط-و-ق. The lexicographers relate the root to ṭawq: the ring put round the neck, a collar. From this comes ṭāqa: the load that can be put on a person's neck, that he can carry. The word states not "power" but carrying capacity.
The difficulty is this: the expression means literally "those who have the power for it". Yet what is expected of a person who has the power is not to pay a ransom but to fast. The views:
| View | Explanation |
|---|---|
| The ruling has been abrogated | At the beginning there was a choice between fasting and ransom; when verse 185 came down, fasting was settled. The view most widely transmitted in the classical commentaries |
| "Those who can barely manage it" | The word states one at the last limit of his power — such as the aged, or the sick with no hope of recovery. On this view the ruling is in force |
| A variant reading | It is also transmitted that the word is read yuṭawwaqūnahu (those who are hard put to manage it); this reading supports the second view |
I impose no preference and issue no legal ruling. I record only this much: all three views arrive at the same result — the ransom is not an easy road for one who is in a state to fast. Indeed the verse's own closing says as much.
تَطَوَّعَ — root ط-و-ع. This root was treated in the discussions of Nūḥ and al-Qalam; the summary of the finding there: beneath the root lies willing compliance; its opposite is karh (unwillingly), and in Arabic what is done under compulsion is not called ṭāʿa.
The pattern is Form V and here reinforces the voluntariness: taṭawwuʿ — a work done of itself, over and above, without being asked for. In English the same field is covered by "supererogatory" and "voluntary offering".
Immediately after the ruling is laid down, then, a road is opened for going above the ruling. This is a structure repeated in the legal sections of the sūra: at verse 237 faḍl, at verse 280 taṣadduq, here taṭawwuʿ. Each time a minimum limit is stated and immediately afterwards what lies above it is shown.
The word خَيْرًا occurs three times here: taṭawwaʿa khayran fa-huwa khayrun lahū… wa an taṣūmū khayrun lakum. The repetition itself builds an emphasis, and in the last sentence the matter is settled.
And this shows how the licence is to be read. An ease is given, but it is not said that the ease is the norm. Two sentences stand together: if you cannot, there is a road; if you can, it is better that you do.
إِن كُنتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ — "if you but knew." The conditional clause ties the ground of the ruling to knowledge. This pattern is familiar in the sūra; but here it is turned round: throughout the sūra "and that while you know" (2/22, 42, 75, 188) had been repeated and knowledge had been used as a clause of accusation. Here the same word comes as an invitation.
And the next verse (185) will balance this preference with the principle of ease: "God wants ease for you, He does not want hardship for you." The two verses must be read together — one states the aim, the other how the aim is set.